DSLAMing

TESTING WAN SERVICES ON DSL MODEMS

New Presentation, Who dis?

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What is a DSLAM? Some definitions real quick

Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM)

The headend unit for DSL Modems.

Communicates via ATM (more on this later).

Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) Modem

The **Customer Premises Equipment (CPE)** that attaches downstream from a DSLAM



I have never worked for an ISP.

I have never configured a DSLAM for a production environment.

I have only used DSLAMs in tightly controlled network security lab environments.

This talk is not about configuring a DSLAM securely!

Ok great so what is this talk actually about then?

This presentation is about using a DSLAM to test **Wide Area Network (WAN)** services on DSL modems.

We'll cover:

- Network fingerprint of a DSLAM
- Physical configuration of lab environment
- Basic configuration gotchas for both DSLAM and lab DSL modem
- How to source a DSLAM


And most importantly:

• Why would anyone want to do this?

DSL Modems as IoT Devices

- Non-ethernet WAN port
- Ethernet uses RJ-45
- DSL Modems / Traditional Phone Systems use RJ-14
- Most DSL Modems have a variety of network services running on them
- Attack Surface is generally large because of network services

RJ-14 vs RJ-45 (6-pin versus 8-pin)





RJ-21 (WAN Connection Cable)

Male



RJ-21 (WAN Connection Cable)



RJ-21 (WAN Connection Cable)

Female RJ-21 (the bright blue):

Pictured: Two DSLAMs



ZyXEL IES-1000







11 Form Factor

Two slots for network interface cards

RJ-21 and RJ-14 cards available

Price on Ebay: \$150-\$250 (occasionally cheaper!)

VersaTek - VX1000LD



VersaTek VX1000LD

11 Form factor

Comes with RJ-21 port and ethernet uplink

No interchangeable card slots

Price: \$75-\$150

Note that RJ21 cables run from \$75-\$100 and you will have to have one to connect downstream devices



The following slide includes graphic depictions of cabling.

Viewer Discretion is Advised.

Lab build out for this presentation





Lab build out for this presentation (Inventory)

- Aruba 2930f Core switch
- Zyxel IES 1000 DSLAM
- Two Raspberry Pis
 - One on the WAN side
 - The other has two NICs, one on the WAN side for remote access, and one on the LAN side of a DSL Modem
- Three DSL Modems
 - Netgear DGN2000
 - Netgear D7000
 - ActionTec C1000a CenturyLink Branded

Cool, where can I buy one?

The best place to source DSLAMs cheaply is eBay.

Depending on what kind you want, prices run from about \$150-\$1000

You can get a good DSLAM for \$150 (check out ZyXEL IES-1000)

Sometimes Amazon carries second hand DSLAMs, but the price is often inflated.

Basic Configuration

DHCP is very important. Most DSL modems will not accept a WAN DHCP lease without defined values for DHCP options:

- DNS Server Address
- Gateway address

DHCP Relay is also important, if your DSLAM offers it (IES-1000 does):

IES-1000 DHCP Relay via Web Interface

		$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ C \odot Not secure 192.168.99.5					
ZyXEL TOTAL INTERNET ACCESS SOLUTION	HOME						
TOTAL INTERNET ACCESS SOLUTION		ZyXEL	HOME				
	Bridge Setup	TOTAL INTERNET ACCESS SOLUTION		D. I.I.			
Getting Started			DHCP Relay Setup	<u>Bridge</u> <u>Setup</u>			
 General Setup 		Getting Started					
Bridge Setup	Operating Mode	General Setup Bridge Setup	DHCP Relay Enable				
IP Setup	Bridge Mode : Normal Apply	 Bruge Setup IP Setup 	"Relay Agent Information Option" Enable				
Port Setup		 Port Setup 	Relay Agent Information Apply	1			
Advanced Applications	Normal Mode Setting	Advanced Applications					
 Static Route Setup 	Packet Type Filter	 Static Route Setup 	DHCP server address Delete				
 VLAN Setup 	Port Filter	 VLAN Setup 	192.168.99.1				
Advanced Management	MAC Filter	Advanced Management					
		⊘ SNMP	Add Delete				
• SNMP	MAC Count Filter	⊘ Logins					
 Logins 	MAC Address Record	 Maintenance 					
 Maintenance 	IGMP Snooping Record	 Statistics 					
 Statistics 	DHCP Relay	Diagnostic					
 Diagnostic 		Config Save					
Config Save	<u>802.1X</u>	Logout					
Logout							
	Fast Mode Setting						
	Fast Mode VLAN ID						

IES-1000 Network Fingerprint

```
Host is up (0.0015s latency).
Not shown: 65477 closed ports, 55 filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
23/tcp open telnet
80/tcp open http
MAC Address: 00:13:49:7C:EB:5D (ZyXEL Communications)
Host is up (0.0014s latency).
Not shown: 996 closed ports
PORT STATE
                     SERVICE
67/udp open/filtered dhcps
68/udp open/filtered dhcpc
161/udp open | filtered snmp
520/udp open/filtered route
MAC Address: 00:13:49:7C:EB:5D (ZvXEL Communications)
```



Most DSLAMs run a vendor-specific proprietary **Real Time Operating System (RTOS)** that is not publicly available, let alone open source.





The Layer 2 protocol used in communication between the DSLAM and the DSL Modem WAN port is **Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)**.

7			4	3			0	
GFC				VPI				
VPI				VCI				
VCI								
VCI					PT		CLP	
HEC								
Payload and padding if necessary (48 bytes)								

Source: wikipedia.org

ATM Versus Ethernet





Source: wikipedia.org

ATM Versus Ethernet (Continued)

ATM is divided into **cells**, each of which has a 5 byte header and 48 byte payload for a total of 53 bytes per cell.

Ethernet is divided into **frames**, of which the **data** section is variable length.

VPI and VCI turn out to be important


VCI = Virtual Circuit Identifier

VPI = **Virtual Path Identifier**

Whatever is configured on DSLAM must

equal whatever is configured on the DSL

Modem.



VPI and VPC Uses

- Quality of Service (QoS)
- Traffic Shaping
- Traffic Policing

So now that we have built this huge lab...

Why does anyone care about this?

• DSL Modems can have network services running on the WAN port

Let's say you're writing an exploit that is delivered via **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**, and the exploit is designed to start a telnet daemon on the WAN interface. There's no other way to test such capabilities.

• Many times DSL Modems have secondary firewalls built in to protect the WAN port, making tools like **netstat** insufficient (if it is even on the filesystem).

So for testing exploits? Is that all?

Additionally, DSL modems (like any other sort of network device) often establish connections to manufacturer hosts to check for updates or receive support.

Again, the only way to test / capture such traffic is to use a DSLAM and then perhaps a mirror port on your **Core Switch**.

You will not be able to capture level 2 (ATM) traffic, but you will see reconstructed ethernet packets with the application level packet data intact.

Ok so exploit dev and traffic analysis...

Every once in a while you'll find a manufacturer backdoor:

https://github.com/elvanderb/TCP-32764

Backdoor found in Sercomm products in 2014.

Exploit Development

Sometimes DSL Modems have WAN services that are exploitable, but most of the time the WAN is firewalled so that all 65535 ports are filtered.

In this case, it becomes necessary to "convince" the user (behind the firewall) to perform some action that exploits a LAN-based vulnerability which either returns a reverse shell, or opens a port on the WAN.

If the vulnerability is in the Web interface, CSRF works well for delivering Command Injection exploits because very few DSL Modems have Anti-CSRF protections.



Certain DSL Modems will auto update by fetching a newer firmware version from a manufacturer host.

Sometimes the firmware update comes in the form of an executable shell script with embedded binary.

Sometimes the download happens over HTTP/FTP without any sort of encryption.

Traffic Analysis (continued)

The best way to capture WAN traffic from DSL Modems is to use a mirror port on the upstream switch. If you work one DSL modem at a time, there won't be an overwhelming amount of traffic.

Backdoor

The **TCP-32764** backdoor was discovered in 2014, affecting most if not all Sercomm products.

This was an open port (32764) which returned anyone accessing it a root shell

While mostly this affected the LAN-side of devices, there were some that also had this problem on the WAN port.



So we've now seen why someone might want to test DSL modem WAN interfaces using a DSLAM.

But let's take a step back and ask a bigger question:

"Why would anyone want to hack a DSL Modem?"



The first exploit scenario is the most common with DSL modems / **Small Office Home Office (SoHo)** network equipment:

- 1) Change the upstream DNS server configuration to point to an attacker controlled DNS server
- 2) Redirect all DNS traffic to attacker controlled infrastructure
- 3) Steal credentials as they come over the wire

Man in the Middle Scenarios

Since a DSL modem acts as a network gateway, all traffic on the network flows through it. Having this sort of vantage point as an attacker makes mounting **Man in the Middle (MitM)** attacks trivial (as long as you can compile TCPDUMP for the target architecture). An attacker can sniff / modify traffic as it goes over the wire, exposing plaintext credentials as well as other sensitive data.



Along the lines of the MitM attack, an attacker can use this position on a network to pivot to other devices behind the DSL Modems' WAN firewall. Since most DSL Modems run everything as root, once you have a working exploit, you have root access to the DSL Modem.

This allows an attacker to mount further attacks against endpoints on the LAN.



Find a vulnerability, exploit it to add the DSL Modem to a botnet.

This utilizes the traffic / bandwidth of the DSL modem to overwhelm a specific target in concert with other compromised IoT devices.

The Mirai botnet is the best example of this type of behavior.

Where can I find more information on DSL Modem Exploits?

https://www.exploit-db.com/

Search for DSL.

Currently returns about 120 results detailing various exploits for DSL Modems.

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	2019-02-05	*		×	Zyxel VMG3312-B10B DSL-491HNU-B1B v2 Modern - Cross-Site Request Forgery	WebApps	Hardware	Yusuf Furkan
	2018-10-05	*		4	Netis ADSL Router DL4322D RTK 2.1.1 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Add Admin)	WebApps	Hardware	cakes
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œ۵	2018-09-17	*		~	Netis ADSL Router DL4322D RTK 2.1.1 - Denial of Service (PoC)	DoS	Hardware	cakes
	2018-09-17	*		~	Netis ADSL Router DL4322D RTK 2.1.1 - Cross-Site Scripting	WebApps	Hardware	cakes
±	2018-09-05	*		×	Tenda ADSL Router D152 - Cross-Site Scripting	WebApps	Hardware	Sandip Dey
	2018-08-31	*		~	Vox TG790 ADSL Router - Cross-Site Scripting	WebApps	Hardware	cakes
-	2018-08-24	*		~	Vox TG790 ADSL Router - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Add Admin)	WebApps	Hardware	cakes
	2018-08-15	*		×	ASUS-DSL N10 1.1.2.2_17 - Authentication Bypass	WebApps	Hardware	AmnBAN
PWK	2018-08-02	*		×	ASUS DSL-N12E_C1 1.1.2.3_345 - Remote Command Execution	WebApps	Hardware	Fakhri Zulkifli
WIFU	2018-05-25	*		~	D-Link DSL-2750B - OS Command Injection (Metasploit)	Remote	Hardware	Metasploit
	2018-05-20	*		×	D-Link DSL-3782 - Authentication Bypass	WebApps	Hardware	Giulio Comi
S	2018-04-06	<u>*</u>		×	FiberHome VDSL2 Modem HG 150-UB - Authentication Bypass	WebApps	Hardware	Noman Riffat
	2018-01-25	*		×	ASUS DSL-N14U B1 Router 1.1.2.3_345 - Change Administrator Password	WebApps	Hardware	Victor Calvo
	2018-01-17	ŧ		×	D-Link DSL-2640R - DNS Change	WebApps	Hardware	Todor Donev
	Showing 1 to 15 of 119 entries (filtered from 41,079 total entries)				FIRST PREVIOUS	1 2 3	4 5 8 NEXT LAST	



- https://www.quantumleap.it/d-link-router-dsl-2750b-firmware-1-01-1-03-rce-no-auth/
- https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1591
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45532



A DSLAM can be a useful tool for developing and testing exploits against DSL Modems.



Thank you for joining me for this presentation.

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